military planners and operators, whether they realize it or not, rely heavily on the effectiveness of nuclear deterrence when they project power in the face of our adversaries’ provocations and threats. Our nuclear deterrent therefore strengthens the deterrent effect of our conventional weapons and strategies. interests with conventional weapons and then escalate to a larger-scale conventional war with strategic effects, they will not be able to do so with a reasonable hope that the United States will ultimately back down. Our nuclear deterrent signals to adversaries that should they decide to attack U.S. Our nuclear forces complement our conventional forces and provide a backstop to their use. While the focus of much public commentary is on how the United States ought to shift and add conventional firepower and defensive systems, we cannot miss the salience of the unique contributions of our nuclear deterrent in today’s dynamic threat context. When the stakes are as high as they are, especially in the context of competition against two adversaries-China and Russia-contesting the United States in multiple theaters, the risk of a regional conventional conflict escalating with dire implications increases. An American observer might enthusiastically disagree with the notion that American resolve has weakened, but what matters for deterrence is our adversaries’ perception of our resolve, and the United States has given them reason to doubt. The United States, by failing to invest sufficiently in a modern nuclear enterprise and a reliable triad of modern nuclear delivery systems, has given adversaries reason to doubt. resolve is abetting the deterioration of the credibility of strategic deterrence that has underpinned the post–World War Two order.
There are many factors that have led us here, but the crux of the problem is that as our enemies become more able to challenge the United States, they simultaneously perceive an inverse correlation in the strength of American resolve to defend its stated vital national interests. The global threat environment is more complex and more dynamic than at any time since the end of the Cold War, and the peace that America has enjoyed for 70 years is tenuous. have not agreed and have invested in the weapons they deem most able to thwart U.S. leaders downplayed major-power conflict as a thing of the past.
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has sought to move away from nuclear weapons in its national defense strategy, and as recently as the Administration of President Barack Obama, U.S. By maintaining a force that could reliably contribute to terminating a war with as little damage as possible, should deterrence fail, on terms most favorable to the United States, the United States strengthens deterrence. vital interests, as well as a chemical and biological weapons attack, and provide assurances to allies who have chosen not to acquire their own nuclear capabilities, which is more conducive to preventing a nuclear exchange.Īt the heart of effective nuclear deterrence is the credible threat that the United States is willing to employ nuclear weapons to defend its vital interests when absolutely necessary. They are also intended to prevent large-scale conventional warfare that threatens U.S. nuclear weapons, as expressed in the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), is to deter a nuclear attack, whether small or large in scale, against a U.S. Weapons within the arch of strategic deterrence include conventional and missile defenses, but the nuclear deterrent is the keystone. strategic deterrence is convincing our enemies of our resolve to defend American vital interests from aggression with whatever combinations of weapons are necessary.